Greater Middle East

Returning to the Ancient Damned Land

To say the United States had a history in the Middle East would be an understatement. Since the Cold War, American interests in the ‘Middle East’ had become an element of its foreign policy. The strategy of Containment, and oil industry interests had pushed the U.S. to intervene in the affairs of Middle East countries, along with de-colonization efforts in the immediate post-war period. American governments grew close to the monarchies of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates became close allies or nominal allies of the U.S., providing oil for cheap prices in exchange for military protection. America also received strategic military access to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz through which a large percentage of the world’s oil flowed through. For years, American influence in the region remained relatively uncontested, with the Soviet Union largely pushed out by the time of its collapse. Though, in the aftermath, several governments would go on to challenge American political dominance and the corporate interests of the oil giants.

Fast forward to the early 1990s, and Saddam Hussein, leader of Iraq, had been painted as public enemy number one in the United States. He was a prolific figure in the media, and grew to become a sort of arch-enemy as the Soviets faded into obscurity. Publicly, Hussein was lambasted for his brand of nationalism and apparent desire for national expansion. The U.S. repeatedly sought to contain Hussein’s influence whilst simultaneously leaving open diplomatic ties. The contradictory U.S. position came to a head when Iraq went forward with its invasion of Kuwait. While the U.S. publicly denounced the invasion and the media played it up as unprovoked, the war between Baghdad and Kuwait was much more complex. A web of broken promises, diplomatic overtures, and interests within the halls of the U.S. government had caused what was essentially a casus belli for American intervention in Iraq. President John Glenn had authorized American troop deployments to Saudi Arabia, as the U.S. rallied a coalition of multiple nations to stop Saddam Hussein’s act of aggression. The Gulf War, as it would be known, would unfold over the first few years of the 1990s. Outnumbered, outgunned and lied to, Iraq’s military was pushed out of Kuwait, decimated, and the country bombed by the American-led coalition. While Hussein remained in power, he had been ousted from Kuwait, and the status-quo prevailed.

After 2001, American war hawks and corporate interests were not satisfied with the last war. A mixture of multiple interests, the fringe beliefs of sitting politicians in Washington and many other factors combined to justify another intervention in Iraq. This time, the President at the time, Al Gore, was less than enthused by the prospect of another war. The U.S. had already involved itself in Afghanistan as its sought out revenge for the attacks on the World Trade Center. But, pressured by a Republican-led Congress, and war hawks within the Democratic Party, Gore agreed to the intervention. At the UN, American diplomats made the case for an intervention: Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction in his possession. Chemical, biological and even the means to manufacture nuclear weapons were some of the many things the U.S. charged Hussein with. In the end, the U.S. invaded, conducting a rapid campaign across Iraq and proclaiming victory in short order. Hussein and his Ba’ath political order had been toppled, and in its place, the U.S. would conduct its own brand of state building, led and developed by desk jockey bureaucrats and politicians who had barely stepped out of their offices in D.C.

It had been years since Iraq and Afghanistan. Since then, a great deal of information has become public knowledge. Members of the Gore and subsequent Bush Administration, members of Congress and other American officials had lied about WMDs in Iraq. They had lied about Saddam Hussein’s intentions with Kuwait and the exact relationship between Baghdad and Washington. The very foundations of American interventions in 1991 and 2003 had been based on lies and half-truths. State building had failed, both in Iraq and Afghanistan. After many decades of occupation and extensive funding, the U.S. withdrew under presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, each orchestrated as overt political acts to placate an American public that, for the most part, had grown sick of overseas intervention and war. Though, the interests remained. With bases in the Gulf States, American intelligence remained embedded in multiple countries across the Levant, and the U.S. leveraged its relationship with countries like Jordan to keep an eye on the region. Meanwhile, corporate and foreign interests, strengthened since the days of the interventions, ensured that the U.S. remained at least somewhat present in the region.

As Trump left office in 2025 and Gutierrez entered the picture, he had showcased a strong aversion to the Gulf States. In private meetings, he declined meetings with Saudi and Emirati lobbyists and had been one of the first presidents to not visit Saudi Arabia in his first year in office, instead choosing Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany, Italy, and Turkey as some of his first foreign policy visits. As a Senator, Gutierrez hadn’t opposed the Iraq War per se, but had opposed the conduct of the state building aspects of the post-invasion period. He had also been an advocate for further assistance to veterans suffering from Gulf Syndrome, and had openly condemned the use of torture before Obama’s own speech. Now in the Oval Office, Gutierrez carried with him a sort of “pragmatic interventionist” foreign policy, in which the U.S. continued to strengthen its hard and soft power abroad, but limited its military operations to only critical locations or when no other option was available. Between his stance against further large-scale interventions “without good reason” and his support for increased veterans benefits, Gutierrez had positioned himself to draw in the support of military families and veterans themselves. Though, that position had its own set of weaknesses.

The beginning of the civil war in Iraq had been reported to Gutierrez several weeks before it even began. Between satellite imagery and assets on the ground, the U.S. had a fairly good picture of what was about to go down. Diplomats were withdrawn, leaving behind only critical personnel. In the Green Zone, the U.S. quietly stepped up its security personnel to defend the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. However, when the first shots were fired and Iraq shattered into civil conflict, America made no overt moves to intervene. A mistake, perhaps, but Gutierrez was waist deep in domestic issues, managing the nearly half-year long recession that had struck the country following the bursting of the AI bubble, and had little in the way of political capital to suddenly turn the country’s attention away from economic recovery and toward military intervention abroad. Nevertheless, lobbyists from across the spectrum descended on Capitol Hill and the usual suspects expressed their support for American intervention in Iraq. It was perhaps no coincidence that many of those same interests had agendas that opposed Gutierrez in nearly every way, and had gone out of their way to ensure their preferred candidates were in favorable positions in the upcoming Midterm Elections.

For Gutierrez, every daily brief that came across his desk painted a grimmer picture of the situation on the ground. Geopolitically speaking, America’s presence in Iraq was nowhere to be found. Iran and Russia had free reign, while Canada, led by a much more interventionist government than that of its southern neighbor, had committed resources toward supporting a set of factions of its own preference. The Canadians had been clear from the get go on who they intended to support, and had, perhaps, in reciprocity for Gutierrez’ efforts to rekindle the North American relationship, been transparent with their military operations. In return, Gutierrez had authorized usage of U.S. military facilities in the Persian Gulf, along with intelligence sharing.

Per the briefings, there were several factions involved in the conflict for Iraq. Aside from the humanitarian disaster the conflict would cause, each faction had their own design for Iraq, while others were clear proxies for foreign adversaries. The Russian hardline government and Iran’s own designs for regional supremacy became apparent in the manner through which they were intervening in the conflict. Neither was in U.S. interest. Russia, despite its efforts to conceal its movements had not escaped American intelligence, and their goals were obvious: installing a friendly government in Iraq of the same Marxist-Leninist persuasion as the one in Moscow. Though, even CIA analysts were hard pressed to call the Moscovite state “Marxist.” That aside, Iran’s alignment with Russia had been an unwelcome surprise. America’s relationship with Tehran was complicated. A mix of intertwined economic interests, dual loyalties, and a decades-long game of playing West against East. Iran was, in one word: frustrating.

Holding a meeting of the National Security Council within the chambers of a secured room in Washington (the meeting had to be held outside the White House, as construction crews worked to rebuild the demolished East Wing, left incomplete by Trump after leaving office), Gutierrez had laid out his decision. For weeks, he had been given briefs, intelligence reports, and had held in-person meetings with basically every single intelligence chief in the Community. After analyzing America’s position, they had all largely come to the same conclusion: U.S. influence in the Middle East was under threat, and ‘winning’ the Iraqi civil war would be pivotal in preventing its complete collapse or at the very least, it being reduced further. ‘Everyone’ was at this meeting, ranging from the National Security Advisor, to the head of the Joint Chiefs, to the Commander of U.S. Central Command, the heads of the Intelligence Community, and the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and the Treasury.

Presented with a series of action plans, Gutierrez had decided to go with a sort of middle ground cautious route. Publicly, the U.S. would announce its intention to provide humanitarian aid. The optics would be good domestically, and the media would eat up the visuals. Simultaneously, Gutierrez had chosen to conduct a series of meetings with faction heads, primarily with those of the Ba’ath, the Kurds, the remnants of the Iraqi Government and finally, the famous (or infamous) nationalist cleric, Muqtada Al-Sadr. That last one had drawn Gutierrez’ personal interest, and while nearly everyone in the room seemed to see him as a liability rather than an asset, the President saw him as somewhat more ‘reliable’ than everyone else they’d be contacting. If anything, Gutierrez had said once, “he is fairly consistent.” And consistency, along with an ideology founded in isolationist nationalism was an asset in a region besieged by great powers seeking to carve out a piece.

“Feeler” agents from the CIA would be dispatched to Iraq and Jordan, as far away from Iran as possible. Qatar was seen as too risky, Bahrain too, and the Saudis were marked as untrustworthy. Oman would likely not want to be roped in, though, Gutierrez had insisted on State Department personnel heading to Muscat to try and convince its monarch to allow for the hosting of the secret meetings. Gutierrez wanted no one catching wind of the meetings, not Russia and much less the Iranians. The meeting with Al-Sadr in particular was to be kept secret, both for his own sake and as part of regular opsec. Every analysis of the man showed that even a hint of foreign support could affect him politically. The opposite of what the U.S. was attempting to achieve.

Meetings aside, Gutierrez had authorized a larger-scale intelligence gathering operation in Iraq. Satellites, online and telephone traffic, and on the ground intelligence was to be tapped into or carried out. He wanted to have a backdoor into the opposing factions, and even the factions they were meant to support. What Gutierrez demanded of the likes of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Sixteenth Air Force, the National Security Agency and other was the establishment of an intelligence network in Iraq, that would allow the U.S. to have eyes and ears on nearly every conversation, every operation, every transfer of soldiers, weapons and equipment, every air strike, every communication inside and outside the country. While not necessarily impossible, the effort would be monumental. The CIA would need to spend months finding, cultivating and ensuring the reliability of Human assets, while the NSA and the NRO would need time to crack open secured communications, gather imagery, and tap into cellphones and online activity. More precarious would be the overflights of American reconnaissance aircraft over contested skies and active battlezones. Aircraft could be shot down, crash, or give away U.S. involvement. Nevertheless, plans were set to send in covert and overt aerial assets of the DIA and the Sixteenth Air Force, with the former taking point in the operation.

IMPERIAL STATE OF IRAN
SUPREME COMMANDER'S STAFF
ستاد بزرگ‌ارتشتاران

OFFICIAL STATEMENT

Tehran - 19 Shahrivar 1405 / 10 September 2026

In the Name of God, King, and Country,

The Supreme Commander's Staff of the Imperial State of Iran announces that the Imperial Armed Forces have commenced a new phase of military operations in Iraq.

For weeks, the Imperial State of Iran has watched as the security situation in Iraq has deteriorated. Terrorist organizations have expanded their presence, Ba'athist forces have raised the banners of a regime responsible for some of the darkest crimes in the history of the Iraqi people, and armed factions have increasingly threatened the territorial integrity and stability of Iraq.

The Imperial State of Iran sought cooperation with the Central Government of Iraq and proposed the formation of an Iraqi National Resistance and Counter-Terrorism Coalition. Unfortunately, while these efforts have continued, the threat has grown.

The recent encirclement and threatened attacks against Popular Resistance Front positions in Al-Anbar and Salahuddin demonstrate the consequences of continued inaction.

The Imperial State cannot stand by while Iraqi citizens who have taken up arms against terrorism are surrounded and threatened.

Nor can Iran stand by while the Ba'athist movement attempts to resurrect itself upon the ruins of the Iraqi state.

Therefore, upon the authorization of His Imperial Majesty, Ardeshir Shah Afshar, the Imperial Armed Forces have begun operations in support of the Iraqi people.

Iranian forces are conducting strikes against terrorist and Ba'athist military positions, while providing direct support to Iraqi forces engaged in defending their communities.

These operations are not directed against the Iraqi people.

They are not directed against the Sunni people of Iraq.

They are not directed against the Kurdish people.

The Iranian nation considers not just the Shia and Kurdish peoples of Iraq to be brothers, but all people of Iraq to be our bretheren - bound to Iran by geography, history and civilization. Their safety will not be abandoned because political authorities have failed to act.

Iran likewise calls upon the Sunni people of Iraq not to allow themselves to become instruments of those seeking to revive sectarian war or restore the Ba'athist order.

We remind the Iraqi people of what the Ba'athist regime did.

The mass executions.
The prisons and torture chambers.
The destruction of villages.
The campaigns against the Kurds.
The persecution of the Shia.
The graves left behind throughout Iraq.

Even after their fall, the remnants of this regime cooperated hand in hand with the takfiri ISIS terrorists and continued the slaughter of the Iraqi people.

Iraqis must not forget. Iraq must not forget.

The men raising the banners of that regime today cannot erase the crimes committed against the Iraqi people simply by changing their uniforms or declaring themselves the defenders of Iraq.

The Imperial State of Iran will not permit the return of that government.

Iran does not seek the occupation or annexation of Iraqi territory. We seek an Iraq that belongs to its people — unified, sovereign, secure and free from Ba'athist tyranny and terrorist rule.

Our Armed Forces will therefore continue supporting those Iraqis who are defending their homes and communities against these threats.

The operations now underway will remain focused upon military targets associated with terrorism and the Ba'athist insurgency.

To the people of Iraq: Iran has not abandoned you.

To the terrorists and Ba'athists: your attempt to return Iraq to the past will fail.

And to those who believe that Iran will stand aside while the people of Iraq are threatened:

You have misunderstood the resolve of the Iranian nation.

May God protect the people of Iraq, strengthen those who defend their homeland, and grant peace to the innocent.

Long live the Shah!

Long live Iran!

Long live Iraq!

- Supreme Commander's Staff
ستاد بزرگ‌ارتشتاران
Imperial State of Iran

IMPERIAL STATE OF IRAN
GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
INITIAL OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT - IRAQ THEATER

Prepared by:
General Ali Shadmani
Head of the Operations Directorate
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Imperial State of Iran

Distribution: His Imperial Majesty Ardeshir Shah Afshar; Supreme National Security Council; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Aerospace Force Command; Jamshid Force Command; PRF Liaison Office

--- CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET ---

I. Situation

The decision to intervene directly followed the failure of diplomatic efforts to establish the proposed Iraqi National Resistance and Counter-Terrorism Coalition and the rapidly deteriorating position of the Popular Resistance Front.

Two PRF formations were assessed to be in immediate danger:

• Al-Anbar: PRF forces near the Syrian frontier faced pressure from Al-Sahwa tribal formations.

• Salahuddin: PRF forces at Balad were effectively surrounded by elements of the Islamic Army in Iraq.

The Central Government's subsequent closure of Iraqi airspace to Iranian aircraft has further demonstrated Baghdad's unwillingness or inability to accommodate Iranian assistance, despite the rapidly expanding Ba'athist and jihadist threat.

The General Staff therefore assessed that delaying intervention presented a greater risk to Iranian interests and allied Iraqi forces than proceeding without a finalized political coalition.

II. Air Operations

The principal conventional air component was provided by the Imperial Iranian Air Force's newly established 5th Tactical Fighter Group, operating from Shahid Nojeh Air Base, Hamadan.

The group deployed a significant portion of aircraft consisting of the J-10C, J-20, and Su-35, with the aircraft operating under the direct operational command of General Majid Kazemi.

The jets conducted the primary high-end combat missions of the operation, supported by Iranian unmanned systems and missile forces. Their employment provided the operation with a modern air-superiority and precision-strike capability while limiting the exposure of older Iranian aircraft.

The opening phase relied heavily upon Iranian unmanned systems and missile forces, followed by conventional air operations against identified Ba'athist and terrorist military positions threatening PRF forces.

A small, previously undisclosed squadron of Iranian Kowsar aircraft was also committed to the operation as a specialized low-level strike element.

The Kowsars were tasked with attacking selected targets that remained operational following the initial missile and unmanned strikes. These included remaining air-defense positions, mobile radar and communications facilities, command vehicles, ammunition depots and fuel storage sites supporting Ba'athist and terrorist formations.

The squadron conducted its mission at extremely low altitude, exploiting terrain and gaps in the remaining radar coverage in order to reach targets without drawing the attention of the wider air-defense network. The operation was intended both to eliminate surviving threats to Iranian aircraft and to disrupt the enemy's ability to coordinate its forces.

The deployment of the Kowsars was kept strictly compartmentalized and was not disclosed publicly prior to the operation.

The use of the aircraft was considered particularly appropriate for this mission given their ability to conduct low-level operations and the availability of experienced Iranian pilots familiar with the platform. The mission provided an additional layer to the air campaign while allowing the jets to concentrate on higher-value air-superiority and precision-strike tasks.

The operation was deliberately conducted without public disclosure of individual target methodologies.

Iranian reconnaissance assets maintained continuous observation throughout the operation. Khayyam satellite imagery, Iranian unmanned reconnaissance systems and intelligence provided by Russian partners were used to track enemy movements and assess damage.

At the same time, Iranian aircraft conducted airborne resupply operations for PRF formations, delivering ammunition, medical supplies, food and other essential matériel to forces under pressure.

III. Results

Initial assessment indicates that the operation achieved its immediate objective.

PRF positions in both Al-Anbar and Balad remain operational.

Enemy formations surrounding the PRF positions have suffered significant disruption, with several command, logistics and weapons facilities assessed to have been damaged or destroyed.

Preliminary intelligence estimates approximately 150–220 enemy personnel killed or wounded, although the figure remains subject to revision.

Iranian forces have suffered no confirmed personnel losses during the opening phase.

Several unmanned aircraft were lost or failed to return.

Battle-damage imagery indicates that the majority of designated military objectives were successfully engaged. Russian satellite imagery has independently corroborated several Iranian assessments, while Khayyam imagery has been particularly useful in confirming changes to militant positions before and after the operation.

IV. Resupply and Reinforcement

A land-based logistical corridor is now being prepared to increase assistance to the PRF.

The initial shipments are expected to include Karrar, Chieftan Mobarez, M60A1 Samsam and T-72Z Safir-74 tanks, alongside ammunition, small arms, anti-armor equipment, communications equipment and substantial quantities of Iranian unmanned systems.

Additional Shahed-series drones and other matériel will be provided as required.

The purpose of the resupply effort is to allow the PRF to defend and expand its existing positions without requiring an immediate large-scale deployment of Iranian conventional ground forces.

V. Wider Threat and Kurdish Outreach

The emergence of the Brotherhood Defense Council remains a major concern.

Al-Sahwa's withdrawal from cooperation with Baghdad and its confrontation with the PRF creates the possibility of a wider Sunni mobilization against Iranian-supported forces.

The General Staff therefore recommends that Iranian political and intelligence channels continue distinguishing between Sunni Iraqi communities and the armed factions threatening the PRF.

At the same time, Tehran should accelerate outreach to the Peshmerga and Kurdish political authorities.

The Ba'athist resurgence represents a direct threat to Kurdish interests as well as Iranian and Shia interests. The historical record of the Ba'athist government and its campaigns against the Kurdish population provides a substantial basis for cooperation.

The General Staff further recommends opening discussions with Canadian forces and diplomatic representatives operating in Iraq, where possible. Canada, the Peshmerga and Iran have significant differences in their wider political relationships, but all three possess an immediate common interest in preventing a Ba'athist restoration and containing ISIS.

Cooperation should initially focus on intelligence sharing, humanitarian concerns and the prevention of Ba'athist territorial expansion, without requiring a formal political alignment.

VI. Jaish Salahuddin

The General Staff recommends substantially increasing the involvement of Jaish Salahuddin in the northern theater.

The organization, composed primarily of Shia Feyli Kurds alongside other Kurdish personnel, provides Iran with a unique channel into Kurdish areas while maintaining an established relationship with the Shia political and military network.

Jaish Salahuddin should be encouraged to expand its defensive role against Ba'athist formations and ISIS while maintaining communications with friendly Kurdish factions.

Its participation could also serve as a bridge between the PRF, Iranian forces and Kurdish groups that remain suspicious of broader Iranian military involvement.

VII. Foreign Intervention

The closure of Iraqi airspace by the Central Government creates an additional diplomatic risk.

The United States and other Western governments may attempt to portray Iranian operations as an unlawful escalation or use the conflict as justification for renewed military involvement in Iraq.

The General Staff therefore recommends that all future operations continue to emphasize Iraqi territorial integrity, protection of Iraqi civilians, opposition to Ba'athist restoration, and support for Iraqi forces rather than Iranian political ambitions.

Iran should simultaneously continue diplomatic coordination with Russia while avoiding unnecessary actions that could encourage direct American or broader Western military intervention.

VIII. Assessment

The operation is assessed as an initial success. The immediate objective (preventing the destruction or collapse of the two threatened PRF formations) has been achieved.

However, the strategic situation has become considerably more dangerous.

Iran is now openly involved in the Iraqi Civil War, Baghdad has rejected Iranian military operations, Sunni factions are beginning to consolidate against Iranian-backed forces, and the Ba'athist movement remains capable of mobilizing significant resistance.

The General Staff therefore recommends maintaining the present course:

Protect the PRF, continue pressure against Ba'athist and jihadist forces, establish the Iraqi supply corridor, expand outreach to the Peshmerga and Canadian forces, increase the role of Jaish Salahuddin, and prevent the conflict from developing into either a sectarian war or a direct confrontation with Western powers.

The immediate battle has been won. The wider war has only begun.

- General Ali Shadmani
Director of Operations
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Imperial State of Iran

DOMINION OF CANADA
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
CANADIAN JOINT OPERATIONS COMMAND

INITIAL OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT — IRAQ SITUATION

Prepared by:
Lieutenant General Tim Arsenault
Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command
Armed Forces Council of Canada

Distribution: Prime Minister; National Security Council; Minister of National Defence; Chief of the Defence Staff; Vice Chief of the Defence Staff;
Commander Canadian Army; Commander RCAF; Commander RCN; Commandant Royal Marines of Canada; Commandant Royal Canadian Coast Guard

--- CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET --- CANADIAN/ALLIED EYES ONLY

I. Situation

The collapse of the previous political arrangement in Baghdad and the establishment of the Military Government of Iraq has created a new phase in the Iraqi Civil War.

The Government of Canada has determined that the continued survival of a functioning government in Baghdad remains preferable to the further fragmentation of Iraq, the expansion of Islamist armed groups, or increased foreign control over Iraqi political and military institutions.

Canada will therefore continue its support for the Iraqi government, despite it's change to military rule, while maintaining its separate commitments to the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Peshmerga.

Canadian involvement will remain limited in scope. The main contribution to Baghdad will consist of air operations, intelligence support, military assistance, and the supply of matériel. Canadian ground forces will not be committed to combat operations inside central Iraq without further authorization, but we are not ruling out ground operations.

II. Air Campaign

The main Canadian combat contribution will be an expanded air campaign operating from allied facilities in Jordan and Kuwait, as well as in the Gulf.

The initial air task force is expected to include approximately 40–48 combat aircraft, supported by airborne early-warning, aerial refuelling, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and transport aircraft.

Canadian aircraft will conduct operations against ISIS, Islamist insurgent forces, and other armed formations deemed to be an active threat to Iraqi government forces.

Priority targets will include command facilities, ammunition and fuel depots, artillery positions, armoured vehicles, communications nodes, and concentrations of hostile forces.

The air campaign will be conducted in coordination with Iraqi military authorities and allied governments, while retaining Canadian control over targeting and rules of engagement.

An estimated 3,500–4,000 Canadian personnel will be required to sustain air operations and associated logistics.

III. Kuwait Contingency Force

Canada will deploy the Royal Marines of Canada 1st Division to Kuwait, numbering approximately 9,000–10,000 personnel.

The formation will include Marine infantry, armour, artillery, air defence, engineers, reconnaissance, logistics, and command elements.

The Marine force is not presently intended to enter Iraq.

Its purpose is to provide Canada with a rapidly available ground force should the situation deteriorate, Canadian or allied facilities come under threat, or Baghdad request direct assistance that the Government of Canada subsequently authorizes.

The deployment will also provide a secure reserve capable of reinforcing Canadian forces operating elsewhere in the Gulf.

IV. Kurdistan Regional Government

Canadian support for the Kurdistan Regional Government will continue independently and along side the mission supporting Baghdad.

Canada will deploy an additional 500 troops to the Kurdish region, centred on Camp Érable in Erbil.

These personnel will primarily conduct training, advisory, force-protection and liaison duties alongside the Peshmerga.

Additional intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, medical, logistics and support personnel will also be deployed, bringing the expanded Canadian presence in Kurdistan to approximately 1,500 personnel, subject to the final composition of the force.

Canada will also increase deliveries of ammunition, communications equipment, protected vehicles, medical supplies, surveillance systems and other military materiel to the Peshmerga.

Canadian personnel will continue to assist Kurdish forces with training, planning, intelligence, and defensive operations against ISIS and other hostile formations.

V. Military Assistance to Baghdad

Canada will substantially increase material support to the Military Government of Iraq.

The bulk of assistance will include ammunition, transpor and protected vehicles, communications equipment, spare parts, medical supplies, engineering equipment, counter-drone systems, and other materiel required to sustain Iraqi government forces.

Canadian military advisers and liaison personnel will assist Iraqi authorities with logistics, planning, targeting coordination and the distribution of Canadian assistance.

Canada will not provide unrestricted support to Iraqi forces and will retain oversight over the use and distribution of Canadian-supplied equipment.

VI. Political Conditions

Canadian support for Baghdad remains conditional upon the Military Government respecting Iraq's existing constitutional structure and the autonomy of the Kurdistan Region.

Canada will not support attempts by Baghdad to dismantle Kurdish self-government, reduce the constitutional powers of the KRG, or use Canadian assistance in operations directed against Kurdish forces.

Ottawa will continue encouraging negotiations between Baghdad and Erbil toward a broader settlement regarding Kurdish autonomy, revenue sharing, security powers, and the future constitutional relationship between Kurdistan and the Iraqi state.

Canada will continue to treat the defence of the Iraqi state and the protection of Kurdish autonomy as compatible objectives.

VII. Assessment

The proposed deployment provides Canada with the ability to materially influence the conflict without committing large ground formations to combat inside Iraq.

The air campaign and expanded military assistance should significantly strengthen the position of the Military Government, the reinforced mission in Kurdistan provides a direct assurance that Canadian support for Baghdad does not represent a retreat from Canada's commitments to the Kurdish people.

The recommended Canadian presence across the theatre would total approximately 15,000–17,000 personnel, of whom the large majority would remain outside Iraq.

Canadian military policy on Iraq should remain focused on four key objectives: preserve a functioning Iraqi state, prevent the resurgence of ISIS and other extremist forces, reduce hostile foregin infleunce in Iraq, and ensure that Kurdish autonomy, and security are protected throughout any future political settlement.

RUSSIA’S RETURN TO THE MOON
15 SEPTEMBER 2026

Я знаю, что все вы любите мечтать о космосе и немного завидуете нам, космонавтам. Особенно мальчишки. А знаете, мы вам тоже завидуем. Мы летаем в космос, но это начало. Вас ждут планеты и неизвестные миры.

I know that you all love to dream about space and that you envy us cosmonauts a little. The boys especially. And you know, we envy you too. We fly into space, but this is only the beginning. Planets and unknown worlds await you.

~ Yuri Gagarin, the first man in space

Today on 15 September 2026, the Russian space agency Roscosmos has launched the Luna-29 uncrewed mission to flyby the Moon, testing out a new super-heavy rocket. The launch was attended by various visitors and high-profile government officials, including President Sukhanov and General Director of Roscosmos, Dmitry Bakanov.

The Luna-29 mission follows up months after the Artemis II mission, drawing questions of a new ‘space race.’ Russia’s return to the Moon is a fairly sudden appearance after many years of absence. On 10 August 2023, the Luna-25 mission was launched but had ended with a failed orbital maneuver and crash. The subsequent Luna-26 was a failure, although Luna-27 and Luna-28 were successes. Luna-27 completed a successful flyby while Luna-28 was a sample-return mission.

The previous lunar missions were based on the Energiya super heavy lift rocket, which is also used for Buran. Luna-29 is set apart by a test of Roscosmos’s new 133GK-2 Vulkan rocket, one of the largest and heaviest rockets ever constructed in history. It can carry over 200 tons into Low Earth Orbit, and up to 55 tons on the lunar surface. It features four core RD-0120 engines and eight Zenit boosters with RD-179 engines, the same Zenit boosters used for Energiya. The 133GK-2 Vulkan draws its history from the original 133GK Vulkan rocket designed in 1981 during the Soviet Union, with launches scheduled for the mid 1990s. Although it was abruptly abandoned in 1993 following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The program’s restart would be marked by failures to begin with, although many are now hopeful for Luna-29 to become a success story. Conveniently, both the 133GK-2 and original 133GK share many components with the Energiya rocket making for ease of logistics and manufacturing.

Luna-29 would primarily serve as a technology demonstrator of Russia's new Vulkan rocket, functioning as a superior version of the Energiya. Luna-30 is scheduled for late 2026 to again utilize the same Vulkan rocket design but for a robotic rover and sample-return mission simultaneously. It is debated if the Vulkan rocket will be ready in time for a hastily scheduled manned landing on the Moon rather than utilizing a modified version of the Energiya, which is technically capable of carrying out a manned mission to the moon.

The mission was heavily propagandized throughout Russian media, directed both domestically and internationally. Dmitry Bakanov, the General Director of Roscosmos, would announce that Luna-29 marks the beginning for a new ‘space age’ in the Russian Union. Serving as a bridge towards manned missions to the Moon, the establishment of lunar colonies, and manned missions to Mars. Ambitiously or perhaps delusionally, Bakanov claimed that Roscosmos is now “making advances in research for interstellar space travel”, a milestone which he claimed will be achieved first by Russia and under the Communist Party.

Accelerated development in space was facilitated by former Russian President Petro Symonenko, following general successes of Russian reindustrialization initiated by the Communist Party in 1999. President Sukhanov would further increase funding to the Russian space program, viewing it as crucially tied to Russia’s image and the success of the Socialist system.