Council of Nations

TOP SECRET

FUERZAS MILITARES DE SOLIDARIDAD INTELIGENCIA MILITAR DE SOLIDARIDAD

CENTRO DE MANDO DE LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS DE SOLIDARIDAD

DATE: 03 April 1975

SUBJECT: Soviet Naval Presence in Venezuela and Implications for Hemispheric Balance

DISTRIBUTION:
President Adolfo Pérez
Vice President María Ibáñez
Minister of Defense Martín Roca
Joint Chief Oscar Moreno
Director, Inteligencia Militar de Solidaridad
Director, Inteligencia Central de la Unión
Atlantic Command
Pacific Command

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET – EYES ONLY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The arrival of a Soviet naval task force at Caracas represents the most significant Soviet military presence in the Americas observed to this point.

Particular concern centers upon the presence of the aircraft carrier Indomitable Spirit and accompanying surface combatants.

While Venezuela remains formally independent and non-communist, available intelligence strongly suggests ongoing Soviet efforts to cultivate political influence through anti-colonial, anti-Western, and anti-capitalist messaging.

Current assessment indicates that the Soviet objective is not immediate military confrontation but a show of force with the gradual political realignment of Venezuela into a Soviet-aligned state.

CURRENT SITUATION

Confirmed:
Soviet carrier Indomitable Spirit present in Caracas.

Multiple Soviet escorts present.

Soviet diplomatic activity has increased substantially.

Soviet economic advisors operating within Venezuela.

Soviet messaging increasingly targeting younger political organizations and labor groups.

Not Suspected:

Permanent Soviet basing rights.

Soviet missile deployments.

Soviet combat troops stationed in Venezuela.

Soviet nuclear assets in Venezuelan territory.

STRATEGIC CONCERNS &
HEMISPHERIC PRECEDENT

Should Soviet influence successfully establish a long-term military foothold in Venezuela, future deployments elsewhere in the Americas become substantially easier.

The symbolic importance of Soviet naval aviation operating from South American ports cannot be understated.

POLITICAL SUBVERSION

Soviet doctrine historically seeks influence through:
Political movements.
Labor organizations.
Student groups.
Anti-colonial rhetoric.
Economic dependency.

Current intelligence indicates many of these methods are already being employed.

THREAT TO REGIONAL BALANCE

The emergence of an increasingly cooperative Communist Bloc stretching from Berlin through Moscow to Beijing significantly alters global power calculations.

A Soviet-aligned Venezuela would provide that bloc with a strategic foothold in the Western Hemisphere.

This would fundamentally alter the balance presently maintained between major power centers.

CARIBBEAN ACCESS

Control or influence over Venezuelan ports provides Soviet naval forces:
Access to Caribbean shipping lanes.
Increased operational reach.
Intelligence collection opportunities.
Potential future support infrastructure.

ASSESSMENT OF INTENT

Current assessment indicates Soviet objectives are political rather than military.

Probability estimates:
Political Influence Campaign: HIGH
Long-Term Strategic Partnership: HIGH
Permanent Naval Presence: MODERATE
Creation of Soviet-Aligned Venezuelan Government: MODERATE TO HIGH
Deployment of Strategic Weapons: LOW (Current) HIGHER (Long-Term Risk)

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CUATRO REINO

The Soviet presence does not presently constitute a direct military threat to the territories of the Cuatro Reino.

However, it does represent a challenge to regional equilibrium.

The principal concern is not Venezuela itself.

The principal concern is the introduction of an external superpower into the internal affairs of the Americas.

Such developments have historically resulted in instability, proxy conflicts, and erosion of national sovereignty.

RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION

Course A – Observation
Continue intelligence collection.
Advantages:
Low risk.
Maintains neutrality.
Disadvantages:
Allows Soviet influence to expand unchallenged.

Course B – Regional Containment
Expand cooperation with:
United States
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Bolivia
Paraguay
Uruguay
Advantages:
Preserves regional balance.
Avoids direct confrontation.
Disadvantages:
Requires significant diplomatic effort.

Course C – Strategic Counterweight
Accelerate:
Naval expansion.
Missile force development.
Intelligence cooperation.
Space-based surveillance projects.
Hemispheric defense initiatives.
Advantages:
Long-term deterrence.
Strengthens Cuatro Reino influence.
Disadvantages:
Increased expenditures.

FINAL ASSESSMENT

The Soviet fleet in Caracas should not be viewed as an isolated naval visit.

It should be viewed as a potential opening move in a broader campaign to establish Soviet influence within South America.

The current situation does not warrant military action.

It does warrant heightened vigilance.

The preservation of hemispheric stability requires that no external power be permitted to dominate the political future of the Americas.

Prepared by:
Directorate of Strategic Analysis Inteligencia Militar de Solidaridad

Approved for Distribution:
General Oscar Moreno Chief of the Fuerzas Militares de Solidaridad
TOP SECRET

CBC NEWS

02 July 1975

Stanfield Government Enacts Legislation to Set Permanent Price Controls

Joseph Abraham, Parliamentary Correspondent

OTTAWA, ON – The Stanfield Government has secured a major legislative victory this week following the passage of Bill C-78, the Inflation Reduction and Commodities Stabilization Act, 1975, legislation that will permanently establish federal oversight of prices for a number of staple household grocery products.

The bill, which received Royal Assent on Tuesday, following it's review and approval in the Senate, marks the culmination of nearly 2 years of debate in Parliament and represents one of the most significant economic measures undertaken by the Progressive Conservative Government since their election in the 1972 general elections.

At the centre of the legislation is the creation of the Joint Price Committee (JPC), a permanent body jointly administered by the Ministry of Trade and Commerce and the Ministry of Agriculture. The Committee will be tasked with detemining and setting maximum retail prices and profit margin limits for a limited list of designated household necessities.

The new price controls, or "inflation controls" will apply to a relatively narrow range of products including bread, flour, milk, butter, cheddar cheese, processed cheese products, eggs, sugar, salt, and cooking oil.

Represenitives of the Stanfield Government have argued that the measure is a necessary response to the inflationary pressures that have continued to affect Canadian families throughout the last decade.

Prime Minister Robert Stanfield defended the legislation during Question Period in the House of Commons, just prior to its passage in the Senate, arguing that while the market should remain the primary mechanism for distributing resources and setting prices, the government has a responsibility to ensure that basic necessities remain affordable and Canadians are not impoverished by inflation.

"There is nothing conservative about telling a pensioner that the price of bread is none of government's business" siad the Prime Minister to parliamentarians. "A responsible government must concern itself with the necessities of life."

The new legislation builds upon the temporary price controls introduced under the government's 1972 Inflation Reduction Act, though ministers have repeatedly emphasized that the new framework is considerably more limited in scope and more condusive to addressing the needs of Canadians permanently.

Agriculture Minister Alvin Hamilton welcomed the passage of the bill, stating that the Joint Price Committee would balance the interests of both consumers and producers.

"Canadian farmers deserve fair returns for their work, just as Canadian families deserve fair prices at the grocery store," Hamilton said. "These meassures are intended to accomplish both."

The new legislation has not been without controversy.

Opposition Liberals accused the government of unnecessarily extending federal involvement in the marketplace, warning that permanent price controls could discourage investment and create shortages.

Several Liberal MPs argued during debate that inflation should instead be addressed through broader fiscal and monetary measures rather than direct government intervention.

"Mr. Stanfield proposes to attack inflation by regulating prices. I propose that we address the economic conditions that create inflation in the first place." Opposition Leader John Turner stated during debate in the House. "One treats the symptoms; the other treats the disease."

Business groups have also expressed reservations about the legislation. The Canadian Chamber of Commerce released a statement warning that while the Act's initial scope appears limited, future governments may be tempted to expand meassures and impose upon the market.

Political observers have noted that the legislation represents a distinctly Red Tory or even "Pink" Tory approach to economic management, putting on full display Prime Minister Stanfield's long-standing belief that government has a legitimate role to play in the economy.

The first schedule of regulated prices is expected to be released by the Joint Price Committee later this summer.

With inflation continuing to dominate public concerns across the country, the effectiveness of the new system may ultimately determine whether this becomes one of the defining achievements of the Stanfield Government or just another controversial experiement of Ottawa policymakers.

The Mali Federation - The West Africa Model

1959: The Federation Founded
When the four French colonies of French Sudan, Senegal, Upper Volta, and Dahomey declared their intention to form a federation, both the French Republic and Ivory Coast were in opposition. France opposed the federation, concerned that it would bring such colonies beyond France’s sphere of influence. Meanwhile, Ivory Coast opposed the federation, wary of how a large state could displace its own influence in West Africa.

Despite opposition from both their colonial overlord and one of the major members of French West Africa, French Sudan and Senegal pushed forward with the idea, calling for a conference in Bamako to discuss the federation’s formation. In addition to representatives from all four colonies, the congress also invited representatives from the French Republic and Ivory Coast in hopes of smoothing over differences and concerns. While the Ivory Coast rejected such an invitation, the French Republic sent a delegation.

In the Bamako Conference, pro-federation representatives discussed with the French delegation regarding the federation, making compromises and promises to the French that the federation would not seek a break from the French community, the franc zone, nor seek the immediate removal of their military bases. With such assurances, the French Republic were convinced to support the federation, which has since been agreed to be called the Mali Federation.

With the balance decisively shifting towards federation, all four colonies became full, founding members of the Mali Federation, ratifying the 1959 Federal Constitution.

1960: The Executive Crisis
Shortly after negotiations with the French Republic ended in the formal independence of the Mali Federation on June 20, 1960, a political crisis threatened to undo the newborn federation.

Modibo Keïta of former French Sudan (now Malian Sudan) and Premier of the Mali Federation pushed for a stronger executive for the federation, calling for the complete reorganization of military forces and bureaucracy under a single Presidency. With the federal elections coming up in August and Keïta a favorite to win the presidential elections at the time, this push was seen by many as an attempt to consolidate power into himself.

Without a federal assembly elected yet, the issue was put to a decision by a party congress of the Parti de la Federation Africaine (PFA), the federation-wide political party established. Despite Keïta’s near-absolute influence among Malian Sudanese representatives and considerable connections with many other party members, he was still decisively outvoted by the PFA Congress, thus maintaining the principle of parity and consensus.

In a desperate last attempt to maintain control, Keïta removed Mamadou Dia as vice-premier, who was also in charge of the armed forces, and mobilized the military to enforce his rule. Unfortunately for Keïta, the commanders in the military were more aligned with Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal and his policy of parity. The armed forces kept loyal to Vice-Premier Dia and remained in their barracks.

Disgraced and his political influence exhausted, Keïta stepped down from the premiership and chose to run as one of Malian Sudan’s federal ministers rather than the Federal President.

With his former ally turned political rival reeling from defeat, Senghor was elected to the Presidency unopposed, paving the way for a decades-long dominance of Senegal in Federation politics.

1960s - 1990s: The Senegal Years

With Léopold Sédar Senghor elected as the first Mali Federation President in the 1960 elections, the Federation embarked on a nation-building campaign that sought to strengthen federal institutions and foster interstate ties. Guided by the idea of négritude, which Senghor helped develop, the Mali Federation looked mainly towards promoting social and cultural initiatives to unite the former French colonies.

The federation established the Cultural Institute of West Africa which served not just to document the different cultures and customs of African communities and ethnicities, but to also promote federal consciousness of such cultures. Though ethnic tensions would continue to persist to the modern day, the Institute has done major work in keeping such cultures alive, respected, and relevant. The Institute has since produced several key cultural theorists and anthropologists, several from diverse, ethnic backgrounds within the federation.

Senghor’s administration also pushed for a standard curriculum for basic education across the federation. He reasoned that with a standard, quality curriculum, all federal citizens would be given equal opportunity to education. He further opined that with a standard curriculum, the federation can more organically promote unity amongst the youth. His proposal was criticized for being federal overreach and violative of the federation’s principle of parity by his opponents. Others were simply wary of allowing their state education to be dictated by others that were divorced from the national ideals and values of individual states. Senghor’s proposal would eventually come to pass, though with major revisions and exceptions which to many reduced its effectiveness to pursue its stated goals. Nevertheless, this would serve as the foundation for future educational reform in Mali.

Other than the above initiatives, the Mali Federation in the early 1960s was fairly decentralized in its administration, allowing its member-states to govern themselves for the most part. However, this changed when Ghana entered into a political crisis in 1966.

While Ghana President Nkrumah left the country on February 21, 1966 for a diplomatic mission, the Ghana Armed Forces executed a coup to overthrow his government. Having heard of Ghanaian troop movement from federal intelligence, President Senghor flew to Ouagandougou in Upper Volta to meet with and discuss the situation with the Voltaic officials and military commanders. When it was confirmed that the Ghanaian military had mobilized to overthrow Nkrumah’s government, President Senghor authorized the deployment of Federal forces from Upper Volta into Ghana to counter the coup attempt. With the plotters caught by surprise by Malian intervention, they failed to reorganize and were left isolated from each other. This allowed the Presidential Guard of Ghana holding out in Flagstaff House to break out of the siege, linking up with Malian forces and rally loyalist forces. When President Nkrumah returned to Ghana, the main plotters had been either captured or killed while rebel elements broke away into local resistances. While President Nkrumah did maintain his government in Ghana, the coup left Ghana especially vulnerable to Mali’s influence, eventually leading to the country’s accession to the federation.

The success of the Ghana Intervention marked the start of a more proactive, interventionist, militarist, Mali Federation in West Africa. The Senghor government pushed for major military reforms following the intervention, arguing that the instability of its neighbors required a more efficient and effective military to ensure such chaos would not spill over into the federation. Despite being similar to the proposals of Modibo Keïta just less than decade prior, the reality of regional instability has captured the fear of those in Dahomey, Upper Volta, and Malian Sudan, leading to strong support for military reform.

A federal armed forces, the Mali Armed Forces (FAMa), was formally established. They would be under the President and unlike the local and state armed forces, did not need the approval of the federal ministers to be mobilized and called upon by the President. It would be funded by all members of the Federation according to legislative decision but subject to a minimum total amount per year. Still, the FAMa would also be limited in size and only able to expand beyond such limits through a ⅔ majority Assembly vote.

Infrastructure was also a major focus of the Federation at this time, looking to further connect the member-states and improve the transport of both goods and people across the federation. Efforts centered around the expansion of the Dakar-Niger Railway’s capacity, as well as extending its reach to the south, connecting with Upper Volta.

After serving four terms as Federal President, Senghor retired from politics and supported Abdou Diouf, a Senegalese federal minister and Senghor’s protege. Diouf was elected in 1980.

The Federation once again intervened in The Gambia in 1981 when the Socialist and Revolutionary Labour Party of The Gambia attempted a coup against the government of President Jawara. Federal forces were already prepared to enter The Gambia when President Jawara requested support from Mali, and they easily defeated the socialist forces. Shortly after, President Diouf negotiated a union with The Gambia, forming what is now the Republic of Senegambia.

This union was slightly controversial within the Federation as the question arose as to the legislative seats of Senegambia. Representatives from Senegambia and President Diouf himself pushed to increase their seats in the Federal Assembly to forty, given that The Gambia would effectively become a member while opponents argued that the Senegambia remains as a single member-state and must limit itself to twenty seats. A compromise was reached where Senegambia’s seats would be increased by five. Despite coming to an agreement, this issue would set the tone of Diouf's relationship with the member-states of the Federation.

Diouf would continue Senghor’s domestic policies of improving infrastructure and education. In addition to the Dakar-Niger Railway expansion, Diouf would also pursue the expansion and modernization of the Port of Dakar. While the Port of Dakar contributes significantly to the economy of the Federation as a whole as its major port for both exports and imports, the project was criticized by others as funneling federal funds into Senegalese development once again.

Diouf would also pursue increased federal control over resource exploitation, using much of his influence to consolidate the different state corporations and entities of member-states into a single, federally-managed corporation. While the merger saw major inefficiencies in the short-run due to cultural differences, the consolidation also allowed for a streamlined utilization of resources, leading to greater available capital overall. It also allowed for expertise to spread out across the Federation and opened up resource development in otherwise untouched areas. However, this nationalization push also disincentivized foreign investment into resource development in the Federation.

When the Guinea-Bissau Civil War began in 1998, President Diouf quickly ordered an intervention to support President João Bernardo Vieira. President Diouf was confident in another successful intervention given the Federation’s history and viewed this as a way to recover support in the upcoming Federal elections. However, when government soldiers began defecting en masse to rebel forces, Federal forces were soon isolated. Diouf would be forced to negotiate for the exit of Federal forces from Guinea-Bissau, agreeing to not return. President Vieira would be deposed the following year.

The defeat in Guinea-Bissau removed all chances for reelection for President Diouf and shattered the political hold Senegal had over the Federation. Opposition forces, supported by federalists, political scientists, lawyers, and other local leaders, took advantage of Diouf’s defeat and pushed for a constitutional convention to reform the political system of the Federation.

The 2000 Constitution, also known as the Millennium Constitution, codified many of the institutions formed in the past decades, as well as clarified vague doctrines and loopholes in the 1959 Constitution. It constitutionalized the Mali Armed Forces as a federal institution under the President, including limits and safeguards against their use in cases of foreign expeditions. It also gave more structure to the different branches of government, formalizing many of the powers of the President while also strengthening the legislative. It increased the number of seats of each member-state to forty, once again equalizing their representation while also giving the Assembly the power to modify the distribution of seats by a ¾ majority vote. It also placed term limits on different positions, most notably the Presidency, limiting presidential candidates to 2 terms.

2000-2010: Millennial Democracy

Alpha Oumar Konaré, one of the framers of the Millennium Constitution and the leader of the Malian Party of Labour (PMT), was elected to the Presidency, easily defeating incumbent President Diouf of the PFA. Despite not being part of the PFA which normally dominated federal politics, widespread dissatisfaction with perceived Senegalese control over the Federation and the momentum from the recent constitutional convention allowed Konaré to achieve victory.

His first term was marked with a focus towards rebuilding relations with the Federation’s neighbors and managing the Tuareg insurgency in the far north of the Federation. Konaré preferred a diplomatic approach, moving away from the heavy-handed and militaristic approach used by his predecessors. Through sustained peace talks, he negotiated a cessation of hostilities between Tuareg tribes and Federal forces so that negotiations on autonomy could take place. Nevertheless, he made it a point to work within the bounds of the Millennium Constitution, consulting with co-branches and other political parties to arrive at consensus. The stability of Konaré’s first term allowed for businesses to also slowly but steadily expand and for production to increase throughout the Federation.

With peace and prosperity during his administration, Konaré easily won the 2005 elections as well.

With his second and final term secured, Konaré began pursuing his economic agenda which he hoped would elevate Mali’s economy to the modern era. In addition to further expanding mining operations throughout the Federation, Konaré also pushed for the establishment of mineral processing industries and equipment manufacturing operations. In line with this expansion, Konaré also championed energy security through both the creation of more power plants and grids, as well as expanding off-shore petroleum operations in Ghana and Benin (previously named Dahomey).

Konaré’s economic plan saw the opening of several mining sites for several minerals such as gold, bauxite, iron, and diamond. Other existing mining operations also received investments to acquire better mining equipment and expand their scope. Exploration of petroleum deposits off the coasts of Ghana and Benin also began alongside the search for partners for the extraction. A few ore processing plants began construction as well in Ghana and Malian Sudan.

Though it seemed the Federation was on the path towards an economic miracle, such thoughts were derailed by the resumption of the Tuareg Rebellion. When plans to expand economic development into the Kidal region in northern Malian Sudan were revealed, Tuareg leaders demanded control over such development projects. While President Konaré and the Federation at large were open to allowing significant Tuareg autonomy in the north, conceding mineral rights was seen to be a step too far. This resulted in a breakdown in negotiations, leading to the Tuaregs reigniting hostilities.

While Konaré deployed the FAMa to the north to deal with the Tuareg rebels, the lack of infrastructure in the region severely limited their operations to near population centers. And with the Tuareg’s expertise and familiarity with the arid desert terrain of the Sahel, the rebellion wasn’t looking to be quelled anytime soon.

Nearing 2010, many believed that Konaré would leverage the rebellion to declare a state of emergency and remain in power. However, contrary to such beliefs, Konaré pushed forward with the 2010 elections and stepped down from power, in accordance with the term limit set by the constitution.

2010-2020: The President-General

Given that the Tuareg Rebellion had recently sparked once more, the Federation was again concerned with internal security and looked towards a President that could deliver that. The PFA, looking to return to the Presidency, capitalized on this concern and ran recently retired General Amadou Toumani Touré as their candidate of choice. With Touré’s background in the military and connection with the still popular Konaré (who promoted Touré to General), Touré was able to win with a comfortable majority.

At the helm of the Federation, Touré embarked on a comprehensive counter-insurgency campaign against the Tuaregs. He emphasized that a deliberate strategy, though slow, would be effective and provide lasting peace in the region. His plan included developing the road networks in the north between settlements to improve communications and movement, as well as facilitate the development of the region. His plan was to solidify long-term control in key settlements in the area, starting with Timbuktu, then Gao, then Kidal. This would deny the Tuareg rebels major holdouts in the region, forcing them to waste away in the desert.

The campaign was well-received across the Federation mainly for the minimal casualties it produced. Clashes with Tuareg rebels were few and far in between and most concluded with little to no casualties for Federal forces.

This low-intensity strategy allowed Touré to focus on other matters of the Federation. One particular focus he had was the expansion and modernization of the Mali Air Force (AAM) which he believed was critical in securing the defense of the Federation from both internal and external threats. While opponents tried to block this push, citing constitutional limits, Touré sidestepped this by arguing that the limits only contemplated personnel and not equipment. In any case, more than ⅔ of the Assembly voted in favor of the modernization, making the constitutional question moot.

Touré also supported the expansion of infrastructure within the Mopti region. Though the expansion was primarily to support the campaign in the north, critics believe that Touré was more concerned with diverting funds to his hometown and home country.

Despite some difficulties with his political opponents, Touré was able to claim victory in the 2015 elections as well.

In this term, several of the economic projects and policies of former President Konaré bore fruit. Mineral production and exports had increased dramatically while domestic processing had finally begun. Extraction of petroleum had also been steadily increasing. All of these also had the effect of decreasing employment notably in several parts of the Federation, leading to a period of satisfaction among certain sectors.

However, the latter half of Touré’s administration would be rocked by multiple issues. The infrastructure project in the Mopti region that Touré pushed for was largely behind schedule and reports of corruption were rampant with the handling of the project. Worse still, an incident in the Timbuktu region led to both a local garrison and reinforcements from Mopti to be massacred.

Protests from members of the military, as well as student activists, rose up across the Federation, angered by the mismanagement of Mopti and the Tuareg campaign. While Touré was able to mollify the protests by having the Mopti project officials investigated and ceasing further operations in Timbuktu and Gao until it stabilizes, corruption within the Federation has become an unavoidable issue on the federal scale.

2020-2025: Ghana’s Gentle Giant

With another unpopular PFA president leaving the office, the Federation looked towards another unorthodox candidate, hoping to replicate Konaré. John Kufuor seemed to be that man.

John Kufuor served as one of Ghana’s federal ministers during Konaré’s presidency and has developed a reputation of being a capable spokesman and economist. Being a leading member of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and a man from Ghana, instead of being PFA and either Senegalese or Malian Sudanese, Kufuor was able to rally the votes of those in Ghana, Upper Volta, and Benin. Add that with the frustration within many Malian Sudanese, John Kufuor was able to secure the presidency.

The pandemic served as the immediate proving ground for President Kufuor. To combat the health crisis, he implemented curfews, pushed for a Federal Health Insurance Scheme to help alleviate the medical costs of citizens, established the Federal Ambulance Service and created many medical outposts throughout the Federation.

In the aftermath of the pandemic, Kufuor tackled the issue of education by pushing a school feeding program for students to alleviate both nutritional and financial concerns for students. He also provided a material stipend for schoolchildren so that they could purchase school materials and uniforms.

Kufuor also tackled the economic slump in the Federation by launching a microfinance program to provide cheap and accessible loans to micro and small enterprises so that they can either restart operations or begin business.

While the programs have been subject to several issues of corruption and mismanagement, President Kufuor’s leadership and steady hand was able to keep much of the gains and positives of his programs for the wider public. Nevertheless, the corruption remained notable and prevalent in other sectors of the Federation.

Now, as the 2025 elections approach, it is the question of who will lead the Federation for the next five years that is in everyone’s minds. While John Kufuor has been an able and competent president, he has failed to even address the corruption ingrained in the system nor the Tuareg situation in the north. Add that to the fact that he is already 87 years old.

Would Kufuor retain the support of the Malian public to serve as their leader for another five years? Or will a new face take up the Presidency?

Ubiquitous Computing Summit

Ordem e Progresso

Dr José Manuel Bioucas Dias would do the opening speech inside the Rio De Janeiro Computing Pavillion as the event would be attended by all government ministers and those who rank above them, as they say behind the Doctor or on the sidelines. “Persistence in Inquiry and the arduous slog of Rigorous Simplicity is what has led us to today, A day where compute, tokens, networks and AI are no longer the realm abstract and expensive but the concrete, boring and affordable made possible by Risc architectures and the adherence to the two principles above, from hardware to software from the perspective of a business to an individual what will be showcased at this event will be a new age of accessibility in the digital revolution that will change how you view compute.” The doctor would continue discussing the technical details from bandwidth to clock speeds, Flops, TDP’s, Memory and more as the crystallization and manifestation of decades poured by generations of Lusophone Computer scientists, Data Engineers, Systems integrators and many more, where the dream of Minerals to Microchips has now become reality.

As Guests across the globe would be welcomed at the Pavillion the opening booths would contain affordable consumer compute hardware and software solutions by Lusophone and joint venture entities, at prices and scale never seen before where silicon is not a luxury but a common good in all sense of the word with representatives from third world states particularly being given extra attention by the staff at booths, where everyone was a potential acquirer regardless of what state you were from. The Impulso would receive incredible reviews from the free tests and units provided for further testing with the event not stopping there, there would even be live pc or laptop assemblies where attendees could even participate in some would be prototypes but many were also products to be released or to be announced. The open architectures and the price to performance ratios delivered would be ground breaking to the participants with it being broadcast live. A Powerhouse of a PC for the equivalent of $650-$700 and a utilitarian but powerful $450 laptop built to last and had powerful performance all designed and built in the Lusophone Union with other solutions presented with the bedrock being the SERRA SERIES H, 2200, SMU and Portable.

Guests and Participants looking for more complex and larger scale solutions would also find the pavilion not lacking with Lusophone Silicon all around, from the SERRA DC CPUS, to the Tensor Processors, Inferencecore to the Data Processing Unit Chips and many more that would replace the GPU entirely with ASICS and other dedicated hardware solutions that still provided ample flexibility in their programming. The display would be a statement that all are welcome to compete in the Lusophone Market but it is not unarmed or outwitted. All products on average would be 20% cheaper or deliver 20% better performance and energy efficiency per dollar spent, with all products and solutions priced in the Real regardless of contract size.

The solutions and hardware displayed would be pitched across the globe aided by the Ministry of Foreign affairs especially for developing nations, with the BNDES even establishing a new credit program for those who wish to avail of Lusophone solutions and hardware, with R$75 billion being made available, Lusophone companies would also reach out for partnerships with OEM’s or foreign designers and brands to jointly manufacture or establish operations in their home market and even distributors would be contracted. Lastly the government would even invite the US, China, FNA, India, The European Union and the British Commonwealth to agree too some joint standard bands for RISC, ARM and open source software and systems solutions to reduce the harms that can be done by scrupulous actors, and so consumers have credible benchmarks which the LU adheres to and already has.

Operation Choguk-Tongil
Unified Country
July 25th 4:00 am- August 7th 1950.

Semi classified

Lead Motorized Infantry Group (4 Divisions: 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th Combined):
Total Personnel: 80,000
Total Transport Trucks: 2,400
76mm ZiS-3 Divisional Guns: 192
57mm ZiS-2 Anti-Tank Guns: 96
45mm M1942 Anti-Tank Guns: 144
BM-13 Katyusha Multiple Rocket Launchers: 48
120mm Regimental Mortars: 96
82mm Battalion Mortars: 216
37mm M1939 Anti-Aircraft Guns: 72
DShK 12.7mm Heavy Machine Guns: 144
Reserve / Trailing Infantry Group (6 Divisions: 5th, 7th, 8th, 10th, 12th, 13th Combined):
Total Personnel: 120,000
Total Transport Trucks: 1,200
76mm ZiS-3 Divisional Guns: 216
57mm ZiS-2 Anti-Tank Guns: 108
45mm M1942 Anti-Tank Guns: 144
BM-13 Katyusha Multiple Rocket Launchers: 48
120mm Regimental Mortars: 108
82mm Battalion Mortars: 216
37mm M1939 Anti-Aircraft Guns: 72
DShK 12.7mm Heavy Machine Guns: 144
Armored Brigade Group (2 Brigades: 1st and 2nd Combined):
Total Personnel: 13,000
T-34-85 Medium Tanks: 240
SU-76M Self-Propelled Guns: 100
BA-64 Armored Cars: 40
Total Transport Trucks: 400
Motorized Infantry Regiments: 2
PPSh-41 SMG Assault Battalions: 2

Operation Choguk-Tongil: Detailed Operational Unit Assignments

H0-H16 the first shots would be fired with the symphony of Stalin's organs being heard across the 38th parallel accompanied by 122m field artillery  Comprising the 1st armoured brigade and 2nd and 3rd motorized divisions with a total of 47,500 men and material would be the main spearhead into the ROK, with the force currently stationed in 38th parallel and is to launch an offensive towards the south along the Kaesong-Munsan-Seoul corridor. With the objectives of establishing control over vital transport infrastructure spanning the imjin river and if possible bolster their transport capabilities.
  H16-H35 The spearhead forces are to secure the Seoul-Kaesong highway and establish checkpoints across the secondary and main roads that traverse the Imjin. With the force to use the time to recover and repair equipment in preparation of launching a joint attack on Seoul with Thunder, a secondary objective would be to begin establishing occupational government nodes.
 H0-H1 The offensive would be accompanied by 40 TU 4’s and the entire Provisional Citizens Airforce of Daehan air personnel , the air offensive would be split into three, with 15 of the bombers headed to Seoul targeting the headquarters, 15 headed to Gimpo and 10 headed to Yeouido to decimate the republic of korea airforce and command, to make it easier for the land forces to do their job. With the bombers to refuel and reload with 40 to be sent to Busan to render the port unusable. After which the aircraft are to be divided and attached to the the two main forces to provide support at strong points at H70 they are to transition to a supply role.

2nd armoured brigade, 4th and 6th divisions
H0-H35 The 2nd armoured brigade accompanied by the 4th and 6th divisions also comprising 47,500 men and related material would be tasked with breaching the defenses of the Chorwon-Kumhwa area also known as the iron triangle and ensure the security of transport corridors and they are to neutralize fortified ROK positions in the Uijeongbu Corridor and the Iron triangle in their entirety and rendezvous with the spearhead in the north of Seoul city. 

H35-H70 Seoul is to be taken whether it is to be a pile of rubble or still habitable with high command allocating the most amount of stimulants from coffee to vodka or even chemical products copied from germany that enhances soldiers performance for a few days. The combined force of more than 80,000 with reserves trailing behind and clearing out the remaining pockets of resistance is to take the city within 45 hours with particular enemy strong points being designated rewards, which shall be given to the units who break them from medals to pensions.

H71-H120 The spearhead now well worn at this point would be slow down it’s pace with the reserves now to given full reign to launch a renewed offensive with the spearhead to trail behind for an hour or  two with additional trucks provided to the two armoured brigades, allowing soldiers to sleep more comfortably during the advance and could be woken up at a moment’s notice, to recover from the fatigue of the blitz launched against the south koreans, they would be provided 24 hours of reprieve from H71-H94. Before they once again became the spearhead replacing the reserves, they would secure the  Geum river.
H121-H160 The combined forces now fully refreshed would be led by the second and first armoured brigades to break through and capture Daejon to remove the last obstacle of resistance in the Korean peninsula of the imperialists with an open plain to follow after the city. With the operation to result in the collapse of the republic of korea and the puppets placed by the imperialists.

H160-H260 the Citizens army of Daehan is to continue rooting out the last pockets of resistance by subversives and consolidate control across the rest of the peninsula and islands.