Post

IMPERIAL STATE OF IRAN
GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
INITIAL OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT - IRAQ THEATER

Prepared by:
General Ali Shadmani
Head of the Operations Directorate
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Imperial State of Iran

Distribution: His Imperial Majesty Ardeshir Shah Afshar; Supreme National Security Council; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Aerospace Force Command; Jamshid Force Command; PRF Liaison Office

--- CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET ---

I. Situation

The decision to intervene directly followed the failure of diplomatic efforts to establish the proposed Iraqi National Resistance and Counter-Terrorism Coalition and the rapidly deteriorating position of the Popular Resistance Front.

Two PRF formations were assessed to be in immediate danger:

• Al-Anbar: PRF forces near the Syrian frontier faced pressure from Al-Sahwa tribal formations.

• Salahuddin: PRF forces at Balad were effectively surrounded by elements of the Islamic Army in Iraq.

The Central Government's subsequent closure of Iraqi airspace to Iranian aircraft has further demonstrated Baghdad's unwillingness or inability to accommodate Iranian assistance, despite the rapidly expanding Ba'athist and jihadist threat.

The General Staff therefore assessed that delaying intervention presented a greater risk to Iranian interests and allied Iraqi forces than proceeding without a finalized political coalition.

II. Air Operations

The principal conventional air component was provided by the Imperial Iranian Air Force's newly established 5th Tactical Fighter Group, operating from Shahid Nojeh Air Base, Hamadan.

The group deployed a significant portion of aircraft consisting of the J-10C, J-20, and Su-35, with the aircraft operating under the direct operational command of General Majid Kazemi.

The jets conducted the primary high-end combat missions of the operation, supported by Iranian unmanned systems and missile forces. Their employment provided the operation with a modern air-superiority and precision-strike capability while limiting the exposure of older Iranian aircraft.

The opening phase relied heavily upon Iranian unmanned systems and missile forces, followed by conventional air operations against identified Ba'athist and terrorist military positions threatening PRF forces.

A small, previously undisclosed squadron of Iranian Kowsar aircraft was also committed to the operation as a specialized low-level strike element.

The Kowsars were tasked with attacking selected targets that remained operational following the initial missile and unmanned strikes. These included remaining air-defense positions, mobile radar and communications facilities, command vehicles, ammunition depots and fuel storage sites supporting Ba'athist and terrorist formations.

The squadron conducted its mission at extremely low altitude, exploiting terrain and gaps in the remaining radar coverage in order to reach targets without drawing the attention of the wider air-defense network. The operation was intended both to eliminate surviving threats to Iranian aircraft and to disrupt the enemy's ability to coordinate its forces.

The deployment of the Kowsars was kept strictly compartmentalized and was not disclosed publicly prior to the operation.

The use of the aircraft was considered particularly appropriate for this mission given their ability to conduct low-level operations and the availability of experienced Iranian pilots familiar with the platform. The mission provided an additional layer to the air campaign while allowing the jets to concentrate on higher-value air-superiority and precision-strike tasks.

The operation was deliberately conducted without public disclosure of individual target methodologies.

Iranian reconnaissance assets maintained continuous observation throughout the operation. Khayyam satellite imagery, Iranian unmanned reconnaissance systems and intelligence provided by Russian partners were used to track enemy movements and assess damage.

At the same time, Iranian aircraft conducted airborne resupply operations for PRF formations, delivering ammunition, medical supplies, food and other essential matériel to forces under pressure.

III. Results

Initial assessment indicates that the operation achieved its immediate objective.

PRF positions in both Al-Anbar and Balad remain operational.

Enemy formations surrounding the PRF positions have suffered significant disruption, with several command, logistics and weapons facilities assessed to have been damaged or destroyed.

Preliminary intelligence estimates approximately 150–220 enemy personnel killed or wounded, although the figure remains subject to revision.

Iranian forces have suffered no confirmed personnel losses during the opening phase.

Several unmanned aircraft were lost or failed to return.

Battle-damage imagery indicates that the majority of designated military objectives were successfully engaged. Russian satellite imagery has independently corroborated several Iranian assessments, while Khayyam imagery has been particularly useful in confirming changes to militant positions before and after the operation.

IV. Resupply and Reinforcement

A land-based logistical corridor is now being prepared to increase assistance to the PRF.

The initial shipments are expected to include Karrar, Chieftan Mobarez, M60A1 Samsam and T-72Z Safir-74 tanks, alongside ammunition, small arms, anti-armor equipment, communications equipment and substantial quantities of Iranian unmanned systems.

Additional Shahed-series drones and other matériel will be provided as required.

The purpose of the resupply effort is to allow the PRF to defend and expand its existing positions without requiring an immediate large-scale deployment of Iranian conventional ground forces.

V. Wider Threat and Kurdish Outreach

The emergence of the Brotherhood Defense Council remains a major concern.

Al-Sahwa's withdrawal from cooperation with Baghdad and its confrontation with the PRF creates the possibility of a wider Sunni mobilization against Iranian-supported forces.

The General Staff therefore recommends that Iranian political and intelligence channels continue distinguishing between Sunni Iraqi communities and the armed factions threatening the PRF.

At the same time, Tehran should accelerate outreach to the Peshmerga and Kurdish political authorities.

The Ba'athist resurgence represents a direct threat to Kurdish interests as well as Iranian and Shia interests. The historical record of the Ba'athist government and its campaigns against the Kurdish population provides a substantial basis for cooperation.

The General Staff further recommends opening discussions with Canadian forces and diplomatic representatives operating in Iraq, where possible. Canada, the Peshmerga and Iran have significant differences in their wider political relationships, but all three possess an immediate common interest in preventing a Ba'athist restoration and containing ISIS.

Cooperation should initially focus on intelligence sharing, humanitarian concerns and the prevention of Ba'athist territorial expansion, without requiring a formal political alignment.

VI. Jaish Salahuddin

The General Staff recommends substantially increasing the involvement of Jaish Salahuddin in the northern theater.

The organization, composed primarily of Shia Feyli Kurds alongside other Kurdish personnel, provides Iran with a unique channel into Kurdish areas while maintaining an established relationship with the Shia political and military network.

Jaish Salahuddin should be encouraged to expand its defensive role against Ba'athist formations and ISIS while maintaining communications with friendly Kurdish factions.

Its participation could also serve as a bridge between the PRF, Iranian forces and Kurdish groups that remain suspicious of broader Iranian military involvement.

VII. Foreign Intervention

The closure of Iraqi airspace by the Central Government creates an additional diplomatic risk.

The United States and other Western governments may attempt to portray Iranian operations as an unlawful escalation or use the conflict as justification for renewed military involvement in Iraq.

The General Staff therefore recommends that all future operations continue to emphasize Iraqi territorial integrity, protection of Iraqi civilians, opposition to Ba'athist restoration, and support for Iraqi forces rather than Iranian political ambitions.

Iran should simultaneously continue diplomatic coordination with Russia while avoiding unnecessary actions that could encourage direct American or broader Western military intervention.

VIII. Assessment

The operation is assessed as an initial success. The immediate objective (preventing the destruction or collapse of the two threatened PRF formations) has been achieved.

However, the strategic situation has become considerably more dangerous.

Iran is now openly involved in the Iraqi Civil War, Baghdad has rejected Iranian military operations, Sunni factions are beginning to consolidate against Iranian-backed forces, and the Ba'athist movement remains capable of mobilizing significant resistance.

The General Staff therefore recommends maintaining the present course:

Protect the PRF, continue pressure against Ba'athist and jihadist forces, establish the Iraqi supply corridor, expand outreach to the Peshmerga and Canadian forces, increase the role of Jaish Salahuddin, and prevent the conflict from developing into either a sectarian war or a direct confrontation with Western powers.

The immediate battle has been won. The wider war has only begun.

- General Ali Shadmani
Director of Operations
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Imperial State of Iran